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THE MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY AND A SPARSELY
WORDED CONSTITUTION
It was not unexpected that the Singapore Court of Appeal would reaffirm the
constitutionality of themandatory death penalty for certain forms of drug trafficking
in Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2010] 3 S.L.R 489. Similar arguments had
been raised unsuccessfully before the Privy Council in Ong Ah Chuan v Public
Prosecutor [1981] A.C. 648; [1979–1980] S.L.R.(R.) 710 when it was Singapore’s
final appellate court; and in Nguyen Tuong Van v Public Prosecutor [2005] 1
S.L.R. 103 CA. The appellant in Yong Vui Kong had been convicted of trafficking
in 47.27 grammes of diamorphine. Under theMisuse of Drugs Act (Cap.185, 2008
Rev. Ed.), a person found to have trafficked in more than 15 grammes of
diamorphine must be sentenced to death. The court took the opportunity to explain
in some detail why recent Commonwealth case law on the issuewas distinguishable,
as well as to clarify its prior decision in Nguyen Tuong Van. The appellant made
submissions based on arts 9(1) and 12(1) of the Constitution, which respectively
guarantee rights to life and personal liberty, and to equality before the law and
equal protection of the law. This note examines aspects of the art.9(1) arguments.
Article 9(1) states: “No person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty save
in accordance with law”. The first argument advanced by the appellant was that
the word “law” excludes a mandatory death penalty, as that is a form of inhuman
punishment. He relied, inter alia, on a series of recent Privy Council decisions on
appeal from various parts of the Commonwealth, many on appeal from Caribbean
states. These included R. v Watson [2004] UKPC 34; [2005] 1 A.C. 472; and Bowe
v The Queen [2006] UKPC 10; [2006] 1 W.L.R. 1623. Watson had doubted the
opinion in Ong Ah Chuan that the mandatory nature of the death penalty did not
make it arbitrary and thus not “in accordance with law” within the meaning of
art.9(1) by preventing a court from imposing differentiated sentences on offenders
according to their individual blameworthiness:
“There is nothing unusual in a capital sentence being mandatory. Indeed its
efficacy as a deterrent may be to some extent diminished if it is not”(Ong Ah
Chuan at 672–673).
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Lord Hope of Craighead, speaking for the majority in Watson, said:
“It is no longer acceptable, nor is it any longer possible to say, … that there
is nothing unusual in a death sentence being mandatory. … The decision in
that case was made at a time when international jurisprudence on human
rights was rudimentary …”(at [17]).
The Court of Appeal distinguished these Privy Council decisions because reliance
had been placed on express constitutional prohibitions against inhuman punishment
which have no analogue in the Singapore Constitution (at [61]-[63]). In fact, Ong
Ah Chuan had been found inapplicable to the Bahamaian Constitution in Bowe by
reason of the lack of an equivalent in the Singapore Constitution to provisions
which prohibited subjecting a person to torture or inhuman punishment (Bowe at
[41], cited in Yong Vui Kong at [30]). More importantly, the 1966 Constitutional
Commission appointed to examine how the rights of racial, linguistic and religious
minorities could be adequately safeguarded in the Constitution had proposed an
express prohibition against torture and inhuman or degrading punishment or
treatment. While the Government accepted in principle that no individual should
be subjected to torture, it eventually decided not to amend the Constitution in 1969
as proposed by the Commission. Therefore, it was now inappropriate for the court
to read into art.9(1) a constitutional right that had been decisively rejected by the
government (at [64]-[65], [71]-[72]).
The appellant not only had to demonstrate that the mandatory death penalty
amounted to inhuman punishment, but in the first place it was necessary for him
to convince the court that the sparsely worded art.9(1) included a right against
subjection to such punishment. The court noted the appellant was arguing that a
law which permitted inhuman punishment was not “law” within the meaning of
the term in art.9(1)—that the right to be protected from such punishment should
be read into the term (at [52] and [56]). It did not elaborate on the means by which
this could be achieved. As art.2(1) of the Constitution defines “law” as including
“the common law in so far as it is in operation in Singapore”, the right may be
regarded as amounting to a common law principle so fundamental as to be
constitutional in nature, and thus capable of overriding inconsistent legislation.
Such an approach is not alien to Singapore. The Privy Council held in Ong Ah
Chuan that constitutional references to “law” in such contexts as “in accordance
with law”, “equality before the law”, and “protection of the law” refer to a system
of law which incorporates fundamental rules of natural justice that were part of
English common law (Ong AhChuan at 670). Arguably, the Government’s apparent
rejection of the right was not as clear as the court made it out to be. The
Constitutional Commission’s support for an express prohibition of torture and
inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment was neither referred to by the Select
Committee on the Constitution (Amendment) Bill nor by Parliament prior to the
1969 amendment of the Constitution. The documentary record is thus equivocal
as to why Parliament decided against incorporating the right into the Constitution.
It is possible that legislators felt the existing wording of art.9(1) to be sufficient
protection. Hence, the events of 1969 should not have prevented the court from
taking a generous approach and inferring the right into art.9(1). In any case, it is
significant that the court has not entirely dismissed the possibility of art.9(1)
April 2011] Notes 193
(2011) 127 L.Q.R. April © 2011 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
embodying fundamental common law rules. It commented, obiter, that the
Government’s decision against amending the Constitution to expressly prohibit
torture did not mean that an Act of Parliament which permits torture forms part
of “law” for art.9(1) purposes. The court pointed out that in Ong Ah Chuan the
Board was “not disposed to find that article 9(1) justifies all legislation whatever
its nature” (Ong Ah Chuan at 659), and this might refer to ad hominem statutes or
“legislation of so absurd or arbitrary a nature that it could not possibly have
been contemplated by our constitutional framers as ‘law’ when they crafted
the constitutional provisions protecting fundamental liberties” (at [16] and
[75]).
This view has much in common with McGechan J.’s remark inWestco Lagan Ltd
v Attorney General [2001] 1 N.Z.L.R. 40 HCNZ at [91], to the effect that the
prospect of the courts overriding legislation in egregious breach of fundamental
human rights should be left open in perpetuity.
The appellant also relied onMithu v State of PunjabA.I.R. 1983 S.C. 473. This
Indian Supreme Court judgment was relevant, as the Constitution of India, like
the Singapore Constitution, lacks a specific proscription of inhuman punishment.
Moreover, art.21 of the Indian Constitution is worded similarly to Singapore’s
art.9(1). This case was also distinguished by the Court of Appeal, though not, it
is submitted, on particularly satisfactory grounds. First, the court declined to apply
to art.9(1) the “fair, just and reasonable” test applied by the Indian Supreme Court
to the concept of “law” in art.21, contending that since the test hinged on the court’s
view of the reasonableness of the law in question, it required the court to “intrude
into the legislative sphere of Parliament as well as engage in policy making” (at
[79]-[80]). Fundamental liberties guarantees do not count for much, though, if
courts are unwilling to assess the reasonableness of legislation. There is no escaping
the fact that some policy-making is inherent in human rights adjudication. Rather,
judicial review is best seen as part of a constitutional dialogue between the courts
and the political branches of government, who are entitled to seek a constitutional
amendment if they disagree with a judicial ruling. Secondly, the court stated there
was nothing on a plain reading of art.9(1) which prevented Parliament frommaking
the death penalty mandatory (at [81]-[82]). This was a rather curious argument
since the vague language used in art.9(1) clearly requires judicial interpretation to
determine its scope. Finally, the expansive interpretation of art.21 was said to be
understandable
“having regard to the economic, social and political conditions prevailing in
India and the pro-active approach of the Indian Supreme Court in matters
relating to the social and economic conditions of the people of India” (at
[83]-[84]).
Unfortunately, the court did not explain how the conditions in Singapore were
relevantly different. It merely asserted that the mandatory death penalty had
remained unchanged in Singapore since penal legislation first came into force in
the island in 1872.
The appellant’s second argument was that themandatory death penalty is contrary
to customary international law, and since the latter is “law” within the meaning
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of art.9(1) the penalty is unconstitutional. A similar submission was made in
Nguyen Tuong Van. There it had been claimed that capital punishment by hanging
amounted to cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment, and since there was a
customary international law principle prohibiting its infliction, execution by hanging
violated art.9(1). The Court of Appeal’s judgment in Nguyen Tuong Van
acknowledged that the prohibition against inhuman punishment was widely
accepted to be a customary international law rule, but did not discuss the
relationship between such rules and the concept of “law” in art.9(1). However, the
court stated that in the event of inconsistency between a domestic statute and a
customary international law rule, the former would prevail, citing Cheung (Chung
Chi) v The King [1939] A.C. 160 PCHK; andCollcoDealings Ltd v Inland Revenue
Commissioners [1962] A.C. 1 HL (Nguyen Tuong Van at [91] and [94]). In Yong
Vui Kong, the court clarified that given the dualist nature of the Singapore legal
system, rules of customary international law are not self-executing and do not
become part of domestic law until applied as, or definitively declared to be, part
of domestic law by a domestic court. A court may only regard a customary
international law rule as “law” for the purpose of art.9(1) if it has been transformed
thus into domestic law. However, as mentioned inNguyen Tuong Van, a customary
international law rule cannot be incorporated into domestic law in the face of an
inconsistent statute. The court therefore rejected the appellant’s second argument
on the basis that the usual hierarchy of legal rules would be subverted if a court
could regard rules of customary international law as “law” within the meaning of
art.9(1) as this would give them constitutional status over conflicting legislation
(at [90]-[91]).
The court’s analysis seems to have entirely ruled out the possibility of “law” in
art.9(1) including customary international law rules. A judge will be compelled
to hold that such a rule cannot be incorporated into Singapore common law in the
face of an inconsistent statutory provision; or, if the rule has already been applied
as part of domestic law, an inconsistent statutory provision enacted subsequently
will be regarded as having overridden the rule so as to disentitle the court from
importing it into the concept of law in art.9(1). One wonders whether the court
could have reasoned that since constitutional principles differ qualitatively from
ordinary legal principles, it is open to a judge to declare a rule of customary
international law to be a constitutional rule rather than a common law rule. After
all, common law rules of natural justice were declared to have constitutional effect
by the Privy Council in Ong Ah Chuan. The definition of “law” in art.2(1) of the
Constitution includes written law and the common law in operation in Singapore,
and customs or usages having the force of law in Singapore, which suggests that
the constitutional conception of law extends beyond the enumerated types of law.
Nonetheless, even if the court had accepted this argument, the appellant would
probably not have succeeded, since the court also found insufficient uniform state
practice to establish a customary international law rule that the mandatory death
penalty amounted to inhuman punishment (at [96]).
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